ABSTRACT: This paper proposes an early warning system via a host-based form of intrusion detection that can alert security administrators to protect their corporate network(s). This innovative technique operates through the implementation of battery-based intrusion detection (B-bid) on mobile devices by correlating attacks with their impact on device power consumption using a rules-based host intrusion detection engine (HIDE). HIDE monitors power behavior to detect potential intrusions by noting irregularities of power consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Battery power in mobile computing is a critical resource: no energy, no computing. Without it, all of the electronic functionality users seek in single handheld devices is simply impossible. As recently demonstrated, life for mobile batteries expected to last 30 days may be shortened to as little as one to two weeks when under constant direct attack [1] . Loss of battery power on this order of magnitude in some commercial and military sectors with no immediate access to alternate current wall outlets, can equate to loss of revenue and mission failure. While many techniques are used to maximize power, none to date focus on its constraints to determine if an attack is present. This paper proposes how resident monitoring of demands placed on battery power can be used as an early warning form of hostbased intrusion detection.
Virtually all existing intrusion detection methods are network-centric; however, with the wide-scale proliferation of wireless computing devices, there is a growing need for an efficient host-centric method. To our knowledge, there is nothing in the literature that has theorized and then built an efficient host-centric application for the sake of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for smaller mobile devices. Our Host Intrusion Detection Engine (HIDE) is a rules-based program that leverages sensing abnormal battery behavior as a means of detecting and then identifying a variety of attacks. This paper provides a brief analysis of the issues surrounding and the experimental work in progress on a viable Battery-based Intrusion Detection (B-bid) approach that can integrate relatively easily into the design of any host and network-based IDS to provide greater security.
B-bid measures energy consumed over a period of time to determine if an attack is present. Energy (E) levels can be measured instantaneously or averaged over time (T) on an increasing number of mobile host platforms. Consequently, probabilistic bounds for energy and time can have confidence intervals and are therefore a good means in which to measure abnormal behavior of power dissipation. The technique and efficacy in which these variables of power are measured serves as a profound and viable means for providing additional value to IDS and virus programs as well as protecting battery life.
Moreover, this approach is particularly efficient and straightforward in comparison to many present day IDSs which are based on multiple, complex probability theories over multiple variables (i.e., latency, traffic loads, encryption, etc). This approach also addresses a recognized difficulty in anomaly detection: knowing what features of input to monitor. For example, an attack may alter time of execution and even energy consumption, but it is far more difficult for a hacker to manipulate both energy and time without detection with a B-bid approach integrated into the system. Though not all attacks can be detected, this research indicates a significant number of them can be detected by monitoring power variables and expected bounds of consumption. The remainder of this paper briefly outlines how this can be accomplished.
II. RELATED ISSUES
Security and power are collectively the two most significant and frustrating issues presently facing wireless systems and network developers. Wireless networks are vulnerable to anyone who knows how to intercept radio waves at the proper frequencies. Since data is sent through the air, many traditional "wired" network security measures are considerably less effective [2] . Authentication is the most important step for setting up a secure channel for administrators and data authenticity is the most prominent security risk from a user's point of view. Market pressure for authentication to be faster, transparent and more robust is at odds with constraints of small mobile computing. Computing power and bandwidth are scarce commodities. The use of a computationally intensive cryptosystem, such as RSA, may not be a palatable choice in such environments nor is the use of digital signatures to sign every packet with its private key entirely feasible since these measures are prohibitively inefficient. In short, authentication will continue to be a problem and intrusions will occur.
In order to perform any of these internal calculations, a particular amount of battery power and processor time must be expended. The Advanced Configuration Power Interface is a specification that defines a layered cooperative environment which allows applications, operating systems (OS), and the system BIOS to work together towards the goal of reducing power consumption in computers. Power management enables systems to conserve energy by using less power when idle and by shutting down completely when not in use, thereby extending the useful life of system batteries without degrading performance. Extensions to this convention, Dynamic Power Management (DPM) techniques, have been suggested by Benini et al [3] to take battery constraints into account.
However, battery scheduling and management for multi-battery systems [4] [5] [6] do not address system power consumption, but optimize the battery subsystem to best satisfy power requirements. Another organized power-related effort is the Smart Battery System (SBS) forum [7] , an emerging industry standard which aims to create open communication standards between batteries and the systems they power to improve battery efficiency, and facilitate interoperability between products from battery, software, semiconductor, and system vendors. Their development of the Smart Battery Data (SBData) Specification monitors rechargeable battery packs and reports information to the Systems Management Bus (SMBus), a simple two-wire bus used for communication with low-bandwidth and power related devices on a motherboard [8] . SBS specifications are the only open system level specifications available today that enable standardization of the electrical and data interfaces by defining the SMBus, the SBData, charger and multibattery selector commands. Though not intended for IDS, it is through standardization and compliance to this work that makes B-bid possible.
In every case above, low power design and interoperability have largely been motivated by the need to improve battery life by minimizing power consumption [9] . Yet it is through these developments that B-bid is achievable because truly maximizing battery life requires an understanding of both the source of energy and the systems that consume it --intended and malicious. Recognizing the issue of energy consumption in a mobile environment, power dissipation has rapidly become a first-order design constraint in virtually every type of computing mobile device, but it has not yet been used as a means in itself to determine if and what type of an attack is present in order to protect itself as well as the device. Given there is currently nothing available to provide battery protection, it stands to reason then that it is only a matter of time before more attackers prey on battery life before protection is widely available for it.
For example, one possible side effect of attacks is a significant increase in power consumption of the target, thereby decreasing its expected life through excessive battery consumption. The attacks achieve this by keeping the target device busy and preventing it from going into low power state modes. In some cases, these attacks can be prevented or detected using existing security techniques. Unfortunately, mechanisms to trigger these techniques are currently limited and much power loss and corruption can take place before the techniques are activated. An attack of any kind will consume power and that is why the attack's impact on battery behavior needs to be integrated into IDS and anti-virus programs as an additional layer of defense.
B-bid currently does not detect all attacks; however, it does detect those that either increase the energy drain rate by trying to enter the device and others that have the same effect after having already infected the device.
To summarize our research position and work, we advocate the following points:
• Existing tools and mechanisms for efficient host-based intrusion detection are inadequate and require more research and development directed to fully integrate B-bid related resource monitoring of power properties.
• HIDE software, embedded controller (EC) or OS integrated, has positive impacts on host power preservation under forms of high energy attacks and multiple tasks.
III. METHODOLGY A. IDS Algorithms
Intrusion-detection systems use several types of algorithms to detect possible security breaches, including algorithms for statistical-anomaly detection, rules-based anomaly detection, and a hybrid of the two [10] . Statistical-anomaly detection systems try to detect security breaches by analyzing audit-log data for abnormal user and system behavior. They assume such behavior indicates an attack is taking place. Profiles of normal user and system behavior that serve as the statistical base for intrusion must be built. The main advantages of statistical anomaly detection are that it does not require prior knowledge of security flaws in network systems to detect possible intrusions and it is able to detect many novel attacks. Rules-based detection can characterize most known attacks by tracing a sequence of events. These events can be modeled into high-level system state changes or audit-log events to form rules bases. Rulesbased detection systems monitor system logs and resources, searching for models that match an attack profile or signature. Administrators must regularly update the rules to reflect newly discovered attack methods.
An intrusion detection system should be fast enough to catch different types of intruders before harm is done [11] . The goal of HIDE is to alert the user when a suspected attack is underway before irreparable damage is caused while consuming less power than it saves in the process. The alert is a multi-tiered hybrid form of detection, combining the advantages of both rules-based and statistical-anomaly IDS while eliminating some of their disadvantages, such as their inability to detect new methods of attack and the amount by which behavior must deviate from a profile to detect an attack respectively. Consequently, HIDE first monitors anomalous behavior of the battery when it fails to go into Suspend or Sleep modes.
Depending on the capabilities of the mobile device (see Figure 2 on page four), HIDE then performs one or both of the following operations: sends IDS alarm message to the user and/or nearest supporting proxy server; and then captures and logs any additional information on the cause of increases in energy consumption. For example, given an OS conceivable that these reports from the field may provide an earlier warning system than computers behind firewalls, thereby providing administrator with more time to thwart attacks before they spread to the inner corporate network. A B-bid approach then serves not only protection interests of the mobile host but can benefit the network at large.
B. B-bid Architecture
The B-bid HIDE architecture consists of a software component that uses near real time data to indicate the device's power in Idle state, Busy state and transition between them to detect intrusions. For consistency and handling purposes, only one software-based monitoring unit is preferred. In contrast, no matter where or how many embedded monitoring units are placed in the system, final analysis focuses on measuring the rate of power consumption in each state during pre-determined time slices. The more locations and units there are to assist in this, the more heat generated inside the device [12] , power consumed and chance for inaccuracies in data collection and analysis. Although the most energy efficient method is not necessarily the most effective at detecting attacks and vice versa, HIDE employs more power efficient rules-based techniques as part of an overall cost-benefit consideration in determining the best suited detection method and engine.
To conserve energy, HIDE can be run periodically as a background process when the battery is not in Suspend or Sleep modes. Once a suspicious change in system power usage is identified, the program will run continuously until two or three threshold violations are captured for solely Idle and Busy states respectively. Determining normal thresholds for Idle and Busy states is not difficult, because the absolute minimum current of each state can be determined and calibrated accordingly for each mobile device. Where intrusions are not identified, these are called false negatives. Where normal data activities are identified as anomalous, they are called false positives. Ideally, an IDS minimizes damages of both true positives and performance impacts of false positives. Thus timing in how and when HIDE runs is a key factor for both power spared and performance preserved on mobile hosts as part of the cost of providing additional security. For example, if the HIDE program is suspended too long or too often, a damaging attack may take place. On the other hand, if HIDE runs continuously, resource costs may not be justified.
If normal program behavior is not adequately captured, future unseen normal behavior will be classified as anomalous, thus contributing to the false positive rate. As Figure 1 illustrates in theory, a logical and effective solution is to use a hybrid of statistical and rules-based analysis based on logic which handles a specific set of variables. If/Then rules allow us to easily construct if/then rules that reflect common ways of describing abnormal battery depletion activities (ABDA). These, in our case, are very specific due to the granularity of the data feeds and are founded on well known and measurable battery constraints. In addition, HIDE can be reasonably extended since if/then logic can also adapt for some learning in the forms of weighting given to the input set's defined. 
IV. DESIGN and TESTING

A. HIDE Design
Determining a practical threshold when the device transitions between power states is more challenging given the variety of configurations and actions possible. It is reasonable, however, to determine effective power consumption thresholds in proprietary devices that have a smaller and standard suite of applications and protocols in which both behavior and usage are well known. HIDE will not invoke a more effective and energy demanding virus scan or IDS program until it detects abnormal power consumption multiple times and has user consent (or automatically if user prefers this option). This leverages the human knowledge factor and essentially confronts the user's willingness to sacrifice expected battery life to protect battery life when the system is under attack (of course, this process can be completely automated to bypass human intervention as well as to be less intrusive). This factor also helps to mitigate false positives. Under normal usage and no attack, other security related software will not be automatically invoked by this pervasive style.
As the HIDE flowchart below in Figure 2 depicts, only after a mobile device has a consecutively high rate of consumption in Idle and Busy states does it warrant the user's attention to take action. Juxtaposed accordingly along side the flowchart are present day processor and memory capabilities from low to high-end mobile devices capable of performing these functions. In very small devices, only an alarm warning may be possible. 
B. HIDE Tool Kit
Our experimental results focus on attacks against Dell and NEC PDAs running PocketPC 2003 and CE NET 4.2 OSs respectively. Our methodology and testing has been designed with two additional proof-of-concept goals: to use readily available software and hardware as much as possible and to be a tool readily accessible to users and system/security administrators. To this end, we are using the latest versions of VisualStudio.NET 2003 along with the .NET Compact Framework.
Given this programming environment, we take a variety of code --to include the power related structures provided, API member function calls and a few of our own creation --convert them into C# and then port them over into a variety of mobile device platforms through an emulator. This capability is relatively new and greatly simplifies and empowers the process of developing an application to run on multiple devices.
Figure 2 -HIDE Flowchart Design
Despite HIDE being portable in this fashion to different mobile platforms, power characteristics of the battery must be calibrated and locally stored, preferably in EEPROM (though it is possible to erase, using EEPROM adds an extra layer of protection for sensitive data if security is compromised). The user or developer must also know which devices are not capable of achieving all four states defined by APM and which are not fully supported for battery readings by OEMs who choose the interfacing chipset and the subsequent function calls they will support. In many cases, if these calls are not required by the operating system, OEMs choose not to do the extra work.
C. Device States and Opportunities
For accurate intrusion detection, we must correctly classify intrusions by state. APM defines four power states: Ready, Idle, Suspend, and Off. Ready or Busy is when the system or device is fully powered up and ready for use. Idle is an intermediate system-dependent state which attempts to conserve power. Idle is entered when the CPU is idle and no device activity is known to have occurred within a machine-defined period of time. The machine will not return to a Busy state until a device raises a hardware interrupt or any controlled device is accessed. The Idle state is the lowest level of power consumption available in which all data and operational parameters are still preserved [13] . Computation will not be performed until normal activity is resumed. Resumption of activity will not occur until signaled by an external event such as a button press, timer alarm, receipt of request, etc. When in the Off state, the device is powered down and inactive. Operational and data parameters may or may not be preserved in Off state. These states and the manner in which power management works in most mobile devices are an opportunity for the attacker as well as for HIDE success. For example, when a PDA such as an iPaq goes into Idle, many of its devices are still receiving power. Figure 3 above shows the general current ranges for each operating state as well as the power distribution for a PDA class of devices. [14] affirms the CPU accounts for approximately 30% of power and the screen 42% when backlit. (This varies with each PDA class and the mA readings to the left of Figure 3 are those taken from a Dell Axim.) In Idle the CPU loses nearly all current and the backlight is turned off, equating to about 64% reduction in power. This can be deceiving however, if the wireless LAN card picks up a network request and transmits an acknowledgement. Worse yet, once on, the card may pick up multiple requests, and unless its communication protocol has been altered it will try to send back an acknowledgement every time and more than once. In addition, the power required to transmit is greater than it is to receive. Even if the mobile device is set not to continue to respond to the same IP address, this defense will fail in the case of a distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack directed at it. All the while, a user may have no knowledge this is happening and the battery is being exhausted in a higher energy state. Batteries, like those used in many PDAs, are considered exhausted when their output voltage falls below 80% of the nominal voltage (energy that can be obtained from a cell when it is discharged at a specific constant current) [3] . Thus, a user may discover a "dead battery" if this activity is not checked.
Most recent APM features in PDAs affect battery usage time through adjusting the standby period [14] . Nevertheless, this too does not prevent the system from remaining in Idle under DDOS. Similarly, the default setting for a PocketPC is that it will shut off automatically after 3 minutes of inactivity. However, some mobile devices with PocketPC turn on at midnight every night to roll over the calendar for the next day [13] . When the mobile host wakes up, it sends a query to the base station to see if the base station has any data to send. If the wireless network functionality is already integrated or a LAN card is inserted in the CF slot and the automatic suspend option is not user selected, the Pocket PC could possibly remain on until the battery is drained if an attack or ABDA occurs during this wakeup time.
V. PRELIMINARY TESTING RESULTS
Once the range of Idle is known, a reasonably accurate estimate of power consumption can be made for when the device remains in this state. When sufficiently high (abnormal), previously unknown and unmonitored activity levels in Idle are discovered by the B-bid approach. This also holds true if the device remains in an elevated high consumption rate in Busy. Detecting ABDA takes into account that abnormally high power consumption can be a directed attack against the system or battery as well as probable unacceptable rates for conceivably normal activity, in effect protecting the user from both malicious outsiders and himself. With the exception of some proprietary devices, detecting abnormal behavior is more challenging when the device fluctuates between states or the attack remains just under the threshold alarm set by HIDE for the various states.
Regular pinging with different packet sizes, nmap and ping flooding attacks are detectable by our PDA using HIDE in lab settings and we will soon apply a wide variety of attacks to determine the fidelity of settings while in Idle and Busy states. For example, it was demonstrated that a website can be power unfriendly by displaying an undetectable animated gif, increasing the average power as much as 80% without the user knowing [1] (for laptops and assuming the animation option is user activated). B-bid using HIDE can easily detect and alert the user to such increases. In fact, HIDE can also be executed on command to monitor websites in the event users believe they may be viewing hostile pages or if they wish to ensure it is running due to a prior alarm sounding or as an extra measure of security.
Since chemical states in batteries are altered as a result of time and environmental conditions, HIDE allows for relearning of capacity settings --provided this is supported by the chipset used by the OEM --to try to offset the effects of aging and temperature (temperature having the greatest impact on discharge rate). As outlined in Figure 2 , HIDE adapts to different temperature fluctuations over time (currently set when the temperature reaches 10 0 Celsius change from the last written temperature range). Fortunately, temperature effects on lithium ion batteries, which make up the bulk of power supplies for small computing devices are near linear and flat for "office" temperature of 20-25 0 Celsius [15] [16], meaning there is no need for frequent recalibrations (about once every three months should suffice [16] [17]). We conducted our tests accordingly in this temperature range.
We have designed an algorithm (coupled with an interactive GUI) that successfully monitors instantaneous current of the battery and averages it over a period of time. Depending on the number of applications running, network activity and the PDA settings (such as the backlight) a current is drawn from the battery. If a battery is under a network attack, there is an appreciable increase in network activity leading to higher usage of the battery. If this happens for relatively short period of time, when the user is actually doing no work, the algorithm will detect an ABDA and alert the user. After going through nearly a dozen PDA types with a variety of operating systems installed, the algorithm written was tested conclusively on a Dell Axim X3i because it comes equipped with a smart battery that is ACPI compatible.
We measured the average voltage at equal intervals with and without pinging the Axim PDA on a private ad hoc network, a large WLAN, and both in and out of its cradle. Power protection is not free however, and the user will need to decide if HIDE is worth the associated costs. In our initial lab results, HIDE consumed 6% power under normal usage with no attacks and an estimated 10% power was saved when the system came under four separate attacks and the user was alerted to take corrective actions. This savings would be less if not all attacks were detected; however, the percentage of power lost (see t8-t5/t8 in figure 4) would be even greater if attacks did go completely undeterred. The initial results shown in Figure 4 below are promising and work is underway to reduce HIDE power requirements and to confirm results under other forms of attacks. VI. FUTURE RESEARCH Success of B-bid methodology ultimately relies on our ability to identify the correct thresholds of energy expended over time. Because the main variable trigger is power consumption, we are confident that identifying essential information for battery exhaustion-related attacks will be more straightforward and foolproof than other forms of intrusion detection techniques, which have many other variables to consider. As we move forward in this work, our primary goals in order are:
• to detect novel attacks against systems.
• to reduce false negative and false positive rates.
• to consume less power than we save in identifying attacks.
• to protect the program from being attacked itself.
• to maintain an architecture that can be easily integrated into more powerful IDS and anti-virus methods.
VII. CONCLUSION
An effective intrusion detection strategy implements several layers of defenses. Battery-based Intrusion Detection should be an integral part of this, serving as an innovative and viable approach to significantly increase the probability of detecting an attack and, by virtue of this, protecting the battery life and security of mobile devices as well as providing an early attack warning to larger segments of the corporate network. To our knowledge, our implementation is the first contribution to provide a method of efficient and effective host-based intrusion detection by exploiting power variables related directly to the battery. Although existing intrusion detection methods are almost exclusively networkcentric, there is a growing need for an efficient host-centric method. Moreover, there are no host-centric forms of IDS for small mobile devices and there are none which integrate the benefits of detecting abnormal battery behavior. Given that the percentage of detected and reported attacks against wired systems is believed to be less than 10% [19] , it seems reasonable to suspect that the number of detected attacks on mobile systems is considerably less without host-based IDS.
